Disarmament

On July 9th, 2011, South Sudan became the world’s newest country. Unfortunately, celebrations were short-lived, as small inter-ethnic conflicts slowly erupted throughout the country. Hopes for a peaceful future slowly died as the country rapidly disintegrated into a civil war on December 13, 2013 (Johnson, 2014). The violence was nothing new for the people of South Sudan. Since 1955 the country had been fighting for its independence from its northern neighbour: Sudan (Ahmad, Collins, et al., 2019). In 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed by Sudan and South Sudan, bringing an end to over 50 years of civil war between the North and the South (Johnson, 2014; de Waal, 2014; Rolandsen, 2010) . Similarly to other post-conflict society, southern Sudan found itself with a critical security problem that arises when combatants are left without livelihoods or support networks (de Waal, 2014). Furthermore, small arms and weapons were rampant amongst the population (Skinner, 2012). Sudan had been receiving weapons from over 34 countries: the most coming from China, Iran, and the former Eastern Bloc (Skinner, 2012). Throughout the war Khartoum and the SPLA had also been supporting and arming various local militias to support pop-up proxy wars throughout the region. This put the country in a unique position in 2005, as it was hard to distinguish between civilians and military personnel (Brewer, 2010).

  

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement consists of 5 different agreements, one of them being the Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements, which prioritizes DDR (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2005). The document calls for the DDR of combatants, armed groups, and communities and recognizes the importance of it for a secure and peaceful Sudan as well as for the ex-combatants’ transition to a productive civilian life (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2005). The CPA makes reference to three different groups: military personal from the SPLA or the SAF, other armed groups (OAGs), which consisted of all other local militias that had been actively engaging in the war; and special needs groups (SNGs): also labelled as non-essentials, and consisted of elderly combatants, disabled combatants, women associated with armed forces and groups, and children associated with armed forces or groups (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2005).

​

All other armed groups (OAGs) were outlawed by the CPA and their members were obliged to either disband or integrate into organized forces of either country by January 9th, 2006 if they wanted to be eligible for DDR. This was not as simple as it appeared as some of the groups absorbed into the SPLA, such as the South Sudan Defense Forces, had been enemies of the SPLA and had been funded by Khartoum throughout the second Sudanese civil war.

 

The CPA established an interim DDR Program (IDDRP) that was meant to run from 2005-2012 (Nichols, 2011). Overall, the goal was that 180,000 people would be disarmed, 90,000 from the North and 90,000 from the South. Phase I, which was to run until July 9th, 2009, aimed to disarm SNGs and set up and build the capacity of DDR institutions and civil society. Southern Sudan specifically expected to demobilize 34,000 candidates in this phase (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2005; Nichols, 2011; Lamb and Stainer, 2018). Phase II, which was to run from July 9th, 2009 until January 9, 2013, aimed at voluntarily demobilizing active soldiers and downsizing the armed forces. South Sudan expected to demobilize 53,400 active soldiers in this phase (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2005; Nichols, 2011; Lamb and Stainer, 2018).

 

Despite all these criteria about the form the DDR program should take, the CPA was very vague about implementation. All it did was create institutions that would be responsible for overseeing the process. A National DDR Coordination Council (NDDRCC) was created to oversee the North DDR Commission and the South DDR Commission (Skinner, 2012). These commissions would then delegate work to state-level DDR commissions. An integrated UN DDR Unit was also created to support the mission. This unit consisted of members from UNMIS, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, UNPF (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2005). 

 

By 2007 limited progress had been made. In attempts to strengthen the interim program, a National Strategic Plan released in November 2007 laid out more comprehensive instructions that were meant to inform the DDR program (Nichols, 2011). DDR was integrated into South Sudan’s Three-Year Strategic Plan for Recovery and Development that would run from 2009-2011 (Haile & Bara, 2013). Riek Machar, Sudan’s Vice President, also created the Community Security and Small Arms Control Bureau (CSSACB) in his office to promote coordination, information collection, and collaboration within the GoSS for all community security and small arms control initiatives in South Sudan (Skinner, 2012).

 

To further complicate matters, in 2008 President Salva Kiir issued a presidential order announcing a 6-month civilian disarmament program in the South (Skinner, 2012). The motivation for such campaign came from the governor of Jonglei state who was faced with previous failed disarmament campaigns in a region mired with ethnic and inter-communal violence (Nyoat, 2013). This disarmament decree was completely separate to all that was mandated by the CPA (Skinner, 2012). The implication of the decree is that armed civilians are an inherent threat to the ceasefire.

 

Whether there is a legal basis for civilian disarmament is hard to say (Skinner, 2012). There is an ambiguous section of the CPA that states that the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee must “monitor and verify the disarmament of all Sudanese civilians who are illegally armed” (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2005, 14.6.5.15.).  However, there is no official firearms law in South Sudan despite a range of inconclusive provisions in the interim constitution and pre-CPA law that are relevant to questions of civilian arms possession and control (Skinner, 2012). Furthermore, Kiir did not mention the CSSAC Bureau that was created by Machar in December 2007 for this exact purpose… and the Bureau itself was only given its legal mandate one month before the end of the six-month campaign (Brewer, 2010). This makes us wonder to what extent Kiir’s order was simply an executive decree based on authority to reassert his power over the south.

 

The campaign was to be conducted jointly by state authorities and the SPLA, however, each state could implement a program in any way they saw best fit (Skinner, 2012). The UN offered assistance by enhancing coordination and information sharing, facilitating meetings between state governors, and ensuring that weapons collected were secure and not leaked back into circulation (Skinner, 2012). While a significant number of weapons were collected, there was a lot of violence in the process. Coercive measures were used by the SPLA to collect weapons, creating even greater feelings of insecurity amongst local communities. Not all states followed the Presidential Decree and disarmament did not do anything to reduce violence.

 

By June 10th, 2009 a Multi-Year DDR Program (MYDDRP) replaced the interim DDR program (Lamb & Stainer, 2018). Throughout the interim period the government had failed to carry out any DDR operations apart from running a program for children associated with armed forces and groups. A few ad hoc disarmament campaigns had been launched in Eastern Equatoria, Lakes, and Unity but overall the operation proved to be unsuccessful (Lamb & Stainer, 2018; Nichols, 2011). Less than 10,000 people were demobilized/assisted from the original goal of 90,000 (Nichols, 2011).

 

The MYDDRP took a similar structure as the interim program, SNGs were to be targeted first and then military personnel. The MYDDPR was first launched in Mongolla, part of Central Equatoria, targeting a caseload of 34,000 participants. SNGs were prioritized (Lamb & Stainer, 2018). When it came to screening participants, army commanders were responsible for drawing up master lists and prioritized their own personal connections. Reintegration was implemented in CES, EES, WES, Lakes, WBG, NBG, Jonglei, and Warrap (Lamb & Stainer, 2018).

 

A mid-term review of the SSDDRP carried out by the SSDRC and the UNDP in 2010 stated that: the program has not been effective in terms of contributing to the reduction of military capability, military expenditure, nor to confidence building measures; that actual demobilization in SSD only started in 2009, rendering the whole IDDRP fruitless (Haile & Bara, 2013).

 

In 2011, South Sudan’s independence ended both the CPA period and the legal imperative to undertake DDR (HSBA, 2013). The SPLA had actually grown in size due to the continued recruitment and absorption of rebel militias (HSBA, 2013).

 

However, South Sudan stuck to its MYDDP and created the National DDR Commission (NDDRC) to design sustainable government led policies and programs tailored to South Sudan (HSBA, 2013). This finally came into effect 18 months after its design. Partners and donors remained active. For example, the World Bank supported reintegration up to one year; UNMISS helped construct the Mapel Reintegration Center and started construction of two more in Jonglei state and Eastern Equatoria; The German Development Bank offered 2 million EUR for capacity building and reintegration through UNDP and NDDRC; the WFP offered assistance with food provision; and UNICEF helped with child DDR along with UNMISS and SPLA protection units (HSBA, 2013). However, none of them have made substantial commitments to the program as they see it as being overly ambitious given the failures of the interim program (HSBA, 2013).

 

Phase II, the demobilization of ex-combatants finally began in 2013, it was constantly delayed due to logistical problems, shortfall of funds, and political wrangling over ownership (Munive, 2013). The goals of the program were to: reduce the size of the SPLA and SSAF and the other organized services and thereby reduce military spending; to assist the ex-combatants to return to civilian life in their host communities; to help ex-combatants secure sustainable livelihoods through non-military means, to release all person below 18 year of age from the armed forces and support their successful reintegration into civilian life; and part of a broader Security Sector Reform (Munive, 2013). The target caseload was 150,000 members of the organized forces (such as the SPLA, SAF returning to SAF, ex-SPLA members absorbed into the police, wildlife service, prison service, or fire brigade…) in the next six to eight years (Munive, 2013). The disabled were going to remain in the SPLA’s Wounded Heroes program. The plan was to start with 4,500 individuals across 10 training centers (one per state) … however, this was cut down to a pilot of 500 people in Mapel, Western Bahr el Ghazal (Munive, 2013).

 

As of 2013, the pilot program had seen some good results, however, these all came to an end with the start of the South Sudan Civil War on December 13… Between 2013 and 2018 disarmament came to a halt. However, some programs have recently started… whether or not they will be successful is yet to be known.

​

​

​

​

​